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In the Supreme Court of the
State of Utah
W. R. EDDINGTON,
Defendant and Appellant,
vs.
WILLIAM R. CLYDE,
Plaintiff and Respondent.

CASE
NO. 9118

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent herein filed an action against the appellant and Eddington Canning Company, a corporation, wherein the complaint was set forth in two counts. Count No.
1 was an action against Eddington Canning Company, Inc.,
a corporation, on an account for produce sold and dlivered.
Count No.2 was an action against appellant, W. R. Eddington, personally, based upon an alleged guarantee puryorted to have been given by defendant, W. R. Eddington, to
the plaintiff, guaranteeing to the plaintiff payment of the
account by Eddington Canning Company, Inc., a corporation. The appellant denied ever having made a personal
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guarantee to the plaintiff. Motions for summary judgment
were made by the plaintiff against the defendant, Eddington Canning Company, Inc., a corporation, and against the
defendant, W. R. Eddington. A motion for summary judgment was made by the defendant, W. R. Eddington, against
the plaintiff.
The documents upon which the plaintiff relies to constitute a guarantee on the part of the appellant (Plaintiff's
E:mibit "1") is set out as follows, including the letterhead:
''Eddington Canning Company, Inc.
Phone HJU 9-5611 Springville, Utah
March 6, 1957
Mr. William Clyde
Springville, Utah
Dear Bill:
This is to certify that I, personally, will guarantee you
payment for any tomatoes you raise and deliver for us,
or any other crop contracted for, on the day contract specifies for payment.

Very truly yours,

EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY
/s/ W. R. Eddington
W. R. Eddington
WRE/n"
In support of the motion for summary judgment made
on behalf of appellant an affidavit was filed (Tr. 39) signed
by the appellant wherein it was stated that appellant, by
signing the foregoing Exhibit 1, signed said exhibit in his
capacity as president of said co~poration and signed for the
said corporation and that the appellant intended to bind
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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only the assets of the corporation to secure any obligation
due to the plaintiff; that appellant did not intend to bind
his personal assets to secure any obligation owed by the
canning company to the plaintiff.
The Court granted the motion for summary judgment
against the appellant and in favor of the plaintiff.
STATEMENT OF POINTS

POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT "1" IS A GUARANTEE BY
EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY TO TilE PLAINTIFF AND AS A MATTER OF LAW IS NOT A GUARANTEE OF APPELLANT, W. R. EIDDINGTON, T\) PAY
PLAINTIFF IF THE CORPORATION FAILED TO PAY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT "1" IS A GUARANTEE BY
EDDINGTON CANNING COMPANY TO THE PLAINTIFF AND AS A MATTER OF LAW IS NOT A GUARANTEE OF APPELLANT, W. R. EDDINGTON, TO PAY
PLAINTIFF IF THE CORPORATION FAILED TO PAY.
This appeal involves only one point of law and that
is whether or not as a matter of law the appellant is bound
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as a guarantor by reason of Plaintiff's Exhibit "1". It will
be noted that Plaintiff's Exhi!bi.t "1" is written upon the
corporate stationery which bears a corporate letterhead
and that the letter is signed "Eddington Canning Company,
W. R. Eddington." The rule is stated in 13 Am. Jur. Page
994 as follows:
"In determining whether a corporate director, officer
or agent is liable upon a corporate contract, the par-

tiJCular form of the promise in, or signature to, such
contract is of prime importance in deducing the intention in such respect with which the contract was
executed. A correct form of signature which is uniformly regarded as imposing no personal liability upon
the officer signing is that of a signature containing
the corporate name, followed by the words 'per' or
~by" which, in tum, is followed by the name of a corporate officer. When the word 'per' or 'by' is followed
by the name of more than one officer, however, the
case is not so clear."
Two cases have been found that are almost on all
fours with the present case and which cases are still the
law in their particular states. The first case is St. Joseph
Valley Bank v. Napoleon Motors Company, et al. (Mich.)
202 N. W. 933. In this case the defendant, Napoleon Motors Company, a co~tion, manufactured trucks. Frank
Trude was the vice-president and W. G. Rath, its secretary
and treasurer. In selling trucks it received notes secured
by chattel mortgages. It entered into a contract with the
plaintiff bank by which plaintiff agreed to and did purchase such paper. The contract provided that, if any of
the paper was not paid at maturity, defendant corporation
(therein called the seller) was to pay the same within ten
days. The agreement was prepared by plaintiff and after
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signing was sent to Traverse City (resident of the defendant) for form of guaranty, also written thereon, to be
signed. The guaranty and the signatures were as follows:
"Full performance of seller's obligations under this contract is individually guaranteed by the following persons: Napoleon Motors Company, Frank Trude, Vice
Pres., W. G. Rath, Secy.-Treas."
The notes not being paid as required, plaintiff sued defendant corporation and Trude and Rath, and had judgment in a cause tried without a jury. Trude and Rath appealed and the question was whether they were personally
liable as guarantors.
The Court stated, Page 934:
"The right of the corporation to sign the guaranty is
not questioned. It is said that thi:s is an Indiana contract, to be governed by the laws of that statej. We
think it unnecessary to determine that question, finding the later decisions of the courts of last resort of
that state, so far as applicable, to be in line with the
weight of authority, by which the question will be determined. There is a lack of harmony among the authorities on the question. This is recognized in Second
National Bank v. Midland Steel Co., 155 Ind. 581, 58
N. E. 833, 52 L.R.A. 307, whre earlier decisions of that
state are reviewed.
"If the guaranty had been signed by "Frank Trude, Vice

Pres.," and "W. G. Rath, Secy.-Treas.," and withoutthe name of the corporation, then, considering the
language of the guaranty, particularly "persons" and
"individually," it might be held, under many authorities, that the signers were bound personally, and that
the words "Vice Pres." and "Secy.-Treas." were mere-ly descriptio personae. Second National Bank v. MidSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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land Steel Co., supra; Reever v. First Nat. Bank of
Glassboro, 54 N. J. Law, 208, 23 A. 953, 16 L.R.A. 143,
33 Am. St. Rep. 675. In many cases somewhat similar
to the supposed case, the writing being deemed ambiguous, evidence to show the intention _of the parties
has been held admissible. 3 Cook on Corporations (6th
Ed.) Sec. 724; Second Nat. Bank v. Midland Steel Co.,
supra.
But here the corporation alone, Napoleon Motors
Company, signed the guaranty. It could sign only by
its officer or officers. We cannot ignore its name so
written. And without the signing of its officer or offi.
cers its ·signature would be incomplete. The undertaking so signed must be taken conclusively to be that
of th corporation." (Cases Cited)

"(1)

"Had the word "by" or "per" or "pro" been used before
the signature of either or both officers, it would have
added nothing to the certainty of what is expressed.
Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp. (Mich.) 201 N. W.
484, and cases there cited. The words "persons" and
"individually" and that the signing added nothing to
the contract are not important here, for there is but
one signature on the paper, the signature of the corporation, and hence no ambiguity permitting parol evidence on the question. Liebseher v. Kraus, supra; Falk
v. Moobs, supra; Williams v. Harris, supra."
The other case in point is Bankers' Trust Company,
et al. v. Dockham, et al. (Mass.)) 181 N. E. 174. This is
a case that involved a covenant not to "become interested
in the publishing of any directory in the textile field, which
shall compete for a period of ten years with the present publications of Davision Publishing Company."
graph concluded:

This para-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
"And Stevens Dockham, LHlan M. Dockham and William Martin, being the principal stockholders in the
Seller's corporation, do agree to this same condition
for themselves personally."
The agreement was signed "1Dockham Publishing Company by Stevens Dockham, Pres., Lillian M. Dockham,
Treas.''
Subsequently Stevens Dockham began to compete with
the publications of the plaintiff and this action was filed.
The trial court found:
"I find as a matter of law that since it is apparent from
the contract that Stevens Dockham signed the contract only in his capacity as president of the Dockham
Publishing Company, which plainly appears from the
signature on the contract, that he is not bound individually by any of the terms of the contract and that
the agreement not to compete contained in paragraphs
five and six of the contract are not binding on him individually."
The appellant court stated:
"The contract as executed did not bind Stevens Dockham as an individual."
See also Anderson v. Davis, 234 S. W. 2d 368; New

England Electric Company v. Shook (Colorado) 145 P.
1002.
It is clear that Exhibit "1" was signed in the only manner in which a corporation may sign, which is through an authorized agent, and in this particular case through the
president of the corporation; that there can be no personal
liability on the part of the president by reason of having
signed such a document. It is further clear from the affiSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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davit of the appellant that if there be any ambiguity in
Exhibit "1" whereby the court might admit evidence to explain the ambiguity, that the intent is clearly shown by
such affidavit (Tr. 39) that appellant did not intend to personaly bind himself. The affidavit on file of the plaintiff
(Tr. 41) confirms that the plaintiff had no oral discussions
with an agent of the appellant but that plaintiff had a discussion with an agent of the Eddington Canning COmpany,
Inc., a cooporation, which would not be admissible evidence
as far as appellant is concerned.

POINT IT
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN GRANTING PLAINTIF1F'S MOTI:ON FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

From what has been said and the law applicable to
Point No. I it is clear that the trial court erred in failing
to grant appellant's motion for summary judgment and in
granting plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against
this appellant.
Respectfully submitted,
S. REX LEWIS, for:
HOWARD & LEWIS,
Attorneys for Defendant and
kppellant, W. R. Eddington
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